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ABSTRACT  
 
 
 
The Genocide Convention is hailed as a great protection mechanism and the one 
document that will prevent future destruction of groups. This convention however, has a 
variety of shortcomings that fail to protect groups outside of attempted physical 
destruction. An article criminalizing cultural genocide is a devastating omission and this 
paper seeks to create a working legal definition to be used a framework for creating an 
article or convention to provide such criminalization. Beginning with an analysis of the 
drafting of the Genocide Convention with particular attention paid to the importance of 
culture in the foundation of the convention as well as the debate surrounding the 
inclusion of cultural genocide in the final draft. The arguments used to prevent the 
inclusion of cultural genocide into the final draft provide insight into the fears of states 
and also provided the foundation of the argument for the necessity of the criminalization 
of cultural genocide. The second section analyzes the intersection of culture, law, and 
genocide. Defining culture as an abstraction is difficult and has to be broken down into 
components of culture, which can provide clear legal standards for cultural rights 
protection and the criminalization of cultural genocide. An analysis of current cultural 
protection mechanisms provides an understanding of the dominant viewpoint of culture 
in the international community. Furthermore, this viewpoint provided a majority accepted 
definition of cultural components requiring protection that was used to frame a definition 
of cultural genocide. The final section explicates the necessity of a definition of cultural 
genocide. The remnants of cultural genocide in the Genocide Convention seen in the 
prohibition of the forced transfer of children, demonstrates the importance of preventing 
loses of culture. Furthermore, the definition of cultural genocide is framed by the existing 
definition of genocide, and uses the combination actus reus and dolus specialis in its 
determination. Similar to genocide, the final definition of cultural genocide requires the 
intent to destroy a group as the distinguishing factor between genocidal acts and human 
rights violations. 
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I.  Genocide and Law 
This chapter analyzes the history and drafting of the Genocide Convention; specifically 
addressing the formulation of the definition of genocide and the debate surrounding the 
inclusion of cultural genocide. Furthermore, this section addresses the controversy 
surrounding the inclusion of cultural genocide and its implications on human rights 
protections. 
 
 
The necessity for a definition of genocide and the prosecution of the crime stems 
from the individual‟s right to life, which was then expanded to a group‟s right to exist.1 
The nature of this crime is so extreme and so grave that it required a law and a 
punishment post Nuremberg,  
The origins of the convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to 
condemn and punish genocide as a 'crime under international law' involving the denial of 
the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of 
mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to the moral law 
and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. The first consequence arising from this 
conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are 
recognized by civilized nations as binding on states, even without any conventional 
obligation.
2 
 
The Convention was not the first document that stated that Genocide was a crime; it was 
preceded by a resolution from the General Assembly of the United Nations.
3
 However, 
the Genocide Convention was pivotal is defining and narrowing the concept. The term 
genocide comes from the work of Raphael Lemkin which was used as a basis for the 
formulation of the definition of genocide during the drafting of the Genocide 
Convention.
4
 Lemkin had a multifaceted approach to genocide and sought to express the 
various means of genocide in eight different ways: political, social, cultural, economic, 
                                                     
1
WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  7 (2d ed. 2009). ("The prohibition of genocide is 
closely related to the right to life, one of the fundamental human rights as defined in international 
declarations and conventions.") [ hereinafter  SCHABAS], See also, Reservations to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion), [1951] ICJ Reports 16,p. 
23.Quoted in Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), [1996] ICJ Reports 
226, para. 31. 
2
 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion), [1951] ICJ Reports 16,p. 23.Quoted in Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons 
(Advisory Opinion), [1996] ICJ Reports 226, para. 31. 
3
 SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 5. 
4
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace (1944), See Generally 
WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  (2d ed. 2009). 
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biological, physical, religious, and moral.
5
 Analyzing the general definition created by 
Lemkin, his definition is incredibly broad, considering a plethora of acts to be genocide 
including, ". . . nonlethal acts that undermined the liberty, dignity, and personal security 
of member of a group . . . [as long as] they contributed to weakening the viability of the 
group."
6
 Furthermore, Lemkin specified that genocide should be criminalized regardless 
of whether it was committed during peace or war.
7
 The broadness of Lemkin‟s definition 
allowed the majority of groups to be protected from all means of destruction, even non-
violent ones.  The spirit of Lemkin‟s work was supposed to be present in the finalized 
convention, however, state interests and negotiations led to a stricter definition. 
Prior to the creation of the Genocide Convention, The General Assembly draft 
resolution was adopted unanimously on December 11, 1946 and stated that genocide was 
a crime and requested the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) prepare a convention 
draft.
8
 The General Assembly resolution gave a general definition of genocide and it is 
from this resolution that sparked the creation of the draft a convention. 
9
 The General 
Assembly resolution labeled genocide as an international crime and defined it generally 
as the “denial of the right of existence of entire human groups.” 10 Furthermore, the 
resolution states that the destruction of a group, in whole or in part, “results in great 
losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these 
human groups.”11 The text of this particular resolution states that the focus should be on 
                                                     
5
 MATTHEW LIPPMAN, THE DRAFTING OF THE 1948 CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF 
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, 3 B.U. INT'L L. J.  1,2  (1985) (" Political: The destruction of local democratic 
institutions and the imposition of German rule; Social: The destruction of indigenous social patters and the 
imposition of German law, language, culture, and the deportation of intellectuals; Cultural: the destruction 
of national libraries, museums, galleries and educational institutions and the introduction and propagation 
of German culture; Economic: The impoverishment of the local, non-German population and the transfer of 
economic resources to the local, German population; Biological: The limitation of the birthrate of the local, 
non-German population in contrast to the encouragement of births among the local, German population; 
Physical: the debilitation and annihilation of the national population; Religious: the destruction of local 
religious organizations, shrines and monuments; and Moral: the encouragement of moral debasement and 
depravity in occupied territories."). 
6
WARD CHURCHILL, Defining the Unthinkable: Towards a Viable Understanding of Genocide, 2 OR. REV. 
INT'L L. 3, 11 (2000). 
7
 Sonali B. Shah, Note,  The Oversight of the Last Great International Institution of the Twentieth Century: 
The International Criminal Court's Definition of Genocide, 16 EMORY INT'L. REV. 351, 354 (2002). 
8
 U.N. GAOR, Resolution 96(I), 1
st
 sess., 55
th
 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/86 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
9
SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 53.  
10
 U.N. GAOR, Resolution 96(I),  1
st
 sess., 55
th
 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/86 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
11
Id. 
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the intent to destroy the group in its entirety; this intent can be found in the phrase “denial 
of the right of existence of entire human groups”.12 The text focusing on entire groups 
and their contributions to society demonstrates that genocide has a twofold impact; first, 
the crime is heinous due to the loss of life and secondly, the crime is grave due to the loss 
of cultural contributions. The portion of the resolution that focuses on the cultural 
contributions has often been used as the basis for the argument that the General Assembly 
acknowledges cultural genocide.
13
 Furthermore, Resolution 96 (I) states that these crimes 
occur when the following groups have been destroyed:“racial, religious, political and 
other groups”.14 It is evident from final text, which does not include political or other 
groups, that the spirit of this particular resolution has had limited impact upon the final 
definition of genocide.  
A. The Drafting of the Convention 
The General Assembly resolution 96(I) recommended that the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) to study and draft a convention. After research, in 1947, 
ECOSOC turned over the drafting to the Secretary-General, whose draft stated that 
convention served "to prevent the destruction of racial, national, linguistic, religious or 
political groups of human beings."
15
  The Secretary-General hired Raphael Lemkin as a 
consultant for the creation of the first draft of the Convention.
16
 The Secretariat Draft 
mentioned three types of genocide; physical, biological, and cultural, which directly 
reflected Lemkin's work.
17
 After reviewing the draft and receiving comments,  the 
General Assembly passed Resolution 180 (II) which gave the order to ECOSOC to begin 
drafting the text of the convention.
18
 Lemkin‟s work on the draft was then submitted to an 
                                                     
12
 U.N. GAOR,  Resolution 96 (I),  1
st
 sess., 55
th
 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/86 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
13
 ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting: Lake Success, New 
York Tuesday, 8 April 1948 at 2pm,U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, reprinted in1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA 
WEBB,  THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES  726 (2008) (the comments of Mr. 
Perez-Perozo from Venezuela used the U.N.G.A. Resolution 96 (I) to form the basis of his arguments that 
protection from cultural genocide was necessary as it resulted in the loss of great contributions) 
14
 U.N. GAOR,  Resolution 96 (I),  1
st
 sess., 55
th
 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/86 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
15
Secretariat Draft of Genocide Convention, UN Doc. E/447, 17. 
16
 Ward Churchill, supra note 6, at 13. 
17
 SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 61. 
18
SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 61. 
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ad hoc committee to rework the draft based on state concerns in 1948.
19
 Despite the 
passing of the resolution, some states were still opposed not only to cultural genocide, but 
to the idea of a Genocide Convention in its entirety.  States were very particular about the 
contents of the Convention because it would put their actions under intense scrutiny and 
possibly make them accountable for genocide. 
20
 After the draft went to the ad hoc 
committee, the ideas espoused in General Assembly Resolution 96(I) and the work of 
Raphael Lemkin became less important than state interests. 
The drafting of the Convention reveals the political motivations of states and their 
fear of potentially being held accountable for their actions after the Convention entered 
into force. In the drafting meetings it was proposed that the Committee use three forms of 
genocide; physical, biological, and cultural.
21
  The original definition included all of 
these aspects of genocide and had a detailed list of acts that constituted genocide 
including, but not limited to: segregation of the sexes, obstacles to marriage, forced 
transfer of children, forced exile, prohibiting the use of national language, and destruction 
of historic and religious monuments.
22
 The concept of cultural genocide was originally 
accepted as part and parcel of the Genocide Convention. During the beginning of the 
drafting of the Convention, the idea of destroying a group was not restricted to physical 
means. Despite US objections to the inclusion of cultural genocide, Article III, which was 
the intended article concerned with cultural genocide, was accepted into the draft by a six 
to one vote.
23
 The later vote against the inclusion of cultural genocide is not surprising 
                                                     
19
 Ward Churchill, supra note 16. 
20
 JOHN COOPER, RAPHAEL LEMKIN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 102 (2008) (“ . . . 
if political groups were included in the convention, it would call into question Stalin‟s poltically motivated 
purges of the kulaks (the betty bourgeois) during the forced collectivizations of agriculture in the late 
1920‟s and early 1930‟s.). 
21
SCHABAS, supra note 18,  See also Florian Jessberger, The Definitions And The Elements of The Crime of 
Genocide, in THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, (Paola Gaeta ed. 2009).  
22
 U.N. GA, Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification, Draft 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide at  art 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/42/Rev.1 (12 
June 1947), reprinted in 1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA WEBB,  THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX 
PREPARATOIRES  124  (2008). 
23
 JOHN COOPER, RAPHAEL LEMKIN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 123 (2008) (“ 
Article 3 of the proposed convention defined „cultural‟ genocide as destroying the language, religion or 
culture of groups by prohibiting the use of a language in daily intercourse or in schools or publications and 
demolishing or preventing the use of schools, libraries, historical monuments or places of worship 
belonging to a particular group. . .  Despite the vehement opposition of the United States to the inclusion of 
„cultural‟ genocide in the convention, this article was adopted by six votes to one.”). 
5 
 
due to the  historical context of the creation of the Genocide Convention, which explains 
why states were hesitant to support or even adamantly against certain aspects of the 
definition. During the drafting of the convention, the USSR had already eliminated 
opposition through their political purges and thusly they posited that the inclusion of 
political groups would expand the definition of genocide too greatly.
24
  
The cultural genocide amendment was one of the most controversial during the 
drafting. It is important to note the historical context of the states involved in creating the 
draft in order to highlight the underlying reasons as to why they would be opposed to 
inclusion of cultural genocide. During the drafting of the Genocide Convention, cultural 
genocide was originally included as a provision, as based on the work of Lemkin.
25
 The 
Secretariats draft originally defined cultural genocide as, 
. . .  the destruction of the specific character of the targeted group(s) through destruction or 
expropriation of its means of economic perpetuation; prohibition or curtailment of its 
language; suppression of its religious, social or political practices; destruction or denial of 
access to its religious or other sites, shrines or institutions; destruction or denial of use and 
access to objects of sacred or sociocultural significance, forced dislocation; expulsion or 
dispersal of its members; forced transfer or remove of its children, or any other means.
26 
This definition of cultural genocide is rather expansive and thusly many states were 
adamantly opposed including the United States, for fear of being prosecuted for 
genocidal acts they may have committed.
27
  Once the drafting of the convention was 
passed to ECOSOC, the debate continued as many voiced their disapproval of the 
inclusion of cultural genocide. ECOSOC defined cultural genocide as destruction by 
brutal means [sic] the specific characteristics of a group.”28 The reason for including 
                                                     
24
 WARD CHURCHILL, supra note 6, at 14. 
25
SCHABAS, supra note 18. 
26
WARD CHURCHILL, supra note 6, at 3. 
27
JOHN COOPER, supra note 23.  
28
 ECOSOC, Draft Convent on The Crime of Genocide: Comments on the Draft Convention 234.3, 
U.N.Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947), reprinted in Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide at  art 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/42/Rev.1 (12 June 1947), reprinted in 1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA 
WEBB,  THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES  234-236 (2008). 
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cultural genocide was that cultural diversity was essential and if a group lost its 
distinguishing characteristics, then it failed to exist as a distinct group.
29
 
B. Debating the inclusion of Cultural Genocide 
Genocide is an exceptional crime, one that is particularly horrifying and 
barbaric.
30
 The nature of the crime of genocide requires international criminalization as it 
impacts not only the specific group harmed but humanity as a whole.
31
 Expanding the 
definition of genocide was quite controversial as it was argued that genocide was such a 
special crime that it would decrease the impact if every act were considered genocide.
32
 
This is quite understandable given the historical context of the creation of the convention 
and the need to prevent future occurrences of such a grave act.  The Genocide 
Convention is a huge step forward in the protection of individual and group existence; 
however, it is still insufficient in that it leaves a huge gap in protecting group integrity. In 
regards to cultural genocide, the only remnant of this idea is the criminalization of the 
forced transfer of children.
33
 The destruction of a distinct group is harmful to humanity as 
a whole and this destruction can be achieved through physical and non-physical means. 
The use of non-physical means was understood and considered in the drafting of the 
Convention through the initial inclusion of an article on cultural genocide.  
The potential inclusion of cultural genocide caused numerous debates during the 
drafting.  The arguments posited by many states often appear hypocritical and unfounded, 
                                                     
29
 Id (“ Such a group‟s right to existence was justified not only from the moral point of view, but also from 
the point of view of the value of the contribution made by such a group to civilization generally. If the 
diversity of cultures were destroyed, it would be as disastrous for civilization as the physical destruction of 
nations”). 
30
 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion) [1951] I.C.J. Reports 16, p.23, found in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ( 
Advisory Opinion), [1996] ICJ Reports 229, para. 31. 
31
 David Luban, Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report, 7 CHI. 
J. INT‟L L. 303,309 (2006-2007), See also Nina H.B. Jorgensen, The Definition of Genocide: Joining the dots 
in the light of recent practice, 1 INT‟L CRIM. L. REV 285,287 (2001). 
32
 ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting: Lake Success, New 
York Tuesday, 8 April 1948 at 2pm,U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, reprinted in1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA 
WEBB,  THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES  727 (2008). 
33
 William H. Schabas, Genocide In International Law, 176 (Cambridge Univ. Press UK 2000) (2000). 
7 
 
especially when combined with their support for human rights protections.
34
 Although the 
atrocities of the Holocaust guided the creation of the definition of genocide, political 
interests also played a role in shaping the outcome of the drafting. States were afraid that 
any acts that they perpetrated within their own territory could be a crime under the new 
convention.
35
 The dissent of some states was hypocritical as they supported the 
criminalization of physical genocide since they had recently committed atrocities, 
Such statements contained no small element of hypocrisy coming as they did from a 
country [America] which had barely completed a century-long and continent-wide 
serious of unabashedly exterminationist campaigns against American Indian peoples- 
being at the time in the midst of a concerted drive to eradicate their cultural residues 
through a formal policy of compulsory assimilation- was still wrapping up a similarly 
annihilatory operation in the Philippines which had resulted in the slaughter of as many 
as a million native "Moros," and was busily emulsifying the previously vibrant 
indigenous society of its newly-acquired Hawaiian territory.
36
 
 
While many different fears were voiced, a common fear was that cultural genocide made 
the Convention too broad, states would refuse to ratify it, destroying the tool that nations 
created to protect minority groups.
37
 The idea was to make a minimally invasive 
convention that would have universal appeal so as to ensure ratification; the work of the 
drafting committee would be useless if it failed to produce a document that would be 
binding on states.  Furthermore, a broad definition of genocide would go beyond the 
parameters of U.N.G.A. Resolution 96(I) and a stricter definition would be easier to agree 
on and would make the Convention more effective.
38
 The blurring of the legal brightline 
                                                     
34
 ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Summary Record of the Third Meeting: Lake Success, New 
York Tuesday, 6 April 1948, at 2pm, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.3 (13 April 1948), reprinted in 1 HIRAD 
ABTAHI & PHILIPA WEBB,  THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES  699 (2008). 
35
 Sonali B. Shah, supra note 7, at 355 (“ The United States and the Soviet Union were opposed to 
provisions which each anticipated might be used to criticize their own conduct. The Genocide Convention 
was drafted at a time when Stalin and his regime had already begun their purges targeting political and 
social groups. This, the political forces in effect at the time of the drafting of the Convention contributed to 
the formulation of a conservative definition of genocide.”). 
36
 Ward Churchill, Defining the Unthinkable: Towards a Viable Understanding of Genocide, 2 OR. REV. 
INT‟L. L. 3, 9 (2000). 
37
JOHN COOPER, supra note 23. 
38
 ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting: Lake Success, New 
York Tuesday, 8 April 1948 at 2pm,U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, reprinted in1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA 
WEBB,  THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES  727 (2008) (“ The CHAIRMAN 
warned the Committee against an excessively wide extension of the concept of genocide, which might 
possibly exceed the framework traced by the General Assembly. The fact which initiated the General 
8 
 
for genocide would mean an inadequate criminalization of the crime; therefore, it was 
argued that a strict definition was required.
39
 This particular argument is interesting as it 
rests on the assumption that legal texts are black and white and have no room for 
interpretation. The request for a clearer brightline is understandable insofar as the work is 
done to create a clearer legal text that provides better distinction between what is and is 
not considered genocide. Not only that, but the text that was created as the final definition 
of genocide is also less than clear and has been interpreted in different ways, for example 
the International Criminal for Rwanda has expanded the definition of genocide to include 
rape.
40
 The foundation of the argument that cultural genocide laws were too vague 
essentially masked the fear that those particular laws could be interpreted in such a way 
that holds powerful states accountable for their wrongdoings. Furthermore, when acts are 
compared to the Holocaust in terms of gravity, it is unclear as to what the threshold 
would be to reach a Holocaust like crime. Furthermore, the easiest way to compare 
suspected genocidal acts to the Holocaust would be the amount of destruction, a body 
count, which is not evident in the definition of genocide itself or in the traveux 
preparatoires. This would also defeat the purpose of the Genocide Convention in and of 
itself as the Convention seeks to prevent another Holocaust like crime.  Requiring a 
suspected genocide to be similar to the Holocaust based on any arbitrary qualities fails to 
prevent a Holocaust like act. It is illogical to attempt to prevent an act through a law 
                                                                                                                                                              
Assembly resolution had been to the systematic massacre of Jews by the nazi authorities during the course 
of the last year. Were the Committee to attempt to cover to wide a field in the preparation of a draft 
convention for example, in attempting to define cultural genocide- however reprehensible that crime might 
be- it might well run the risk to find that some States would refuse to ratify the convention. . . “). 
39
 Peter Quayle, Unimagnable Evil: The Legislative Limitations of the Genocide Convention, 5 INT‟L CRIM. 
L. REV.  364,365 (2005) (“ Lippman  notes the contemporaneous warning that “strict definition „must be 
rigidly adhered to; otherwise there is a danger of the idea of genocide being expanded indefinitely. . . „ . . .  
international law must be „built on a rational and logical basis . . .  each idea must be properly defined and 
not overlap each other.‟”). 
40
 Frank Chalk, ‘Genocide in the 20th Century’ Definitions of Genocide and Their Implications for 
Prediction and Prevention, 4 HOLOCAUST & GENOCIDE STUD. 149,151 (1989), see also UNGA, Report of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide . . . , 7 Sept. 
1999, A/54/315 S/1999/943 available at  http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/annualreports/a54/9925571e.htm (“  
The Trial Chamber held that rape, which it defined as "a physical invasion of a sexual nature committed on 
a person under circumstances which are coercive", and sexual assault constitute acts of genocide insofar as 
they were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a targeted group, as such.  It found that 
sexual assault formed an integral part of the process of destroying the Tutsi ethnic group and that the rape 
was systematic and had been perpetrated against Tutsi women only, manifesting the specific intent required 
for those acts to constitute genocide.”). 
9 
 
when that law requires that the suspect act be similar to that which you are attempting to 
prevent. 
  The second argument that appeared often was the cultural genocide was not “as 
bad” as physical genocide. The acts of physical genocide are barbarous and therefore 
needed to be denounced.
41
 While the idea of mass murder is difficult to imagine and cope 
with, it does not mean that murder should be the only crime made illegal. The argument 
is illogical on both the international and the national level. When looking to international 
law, there are numerous crimes that are prosecuted that do not involve murder. For 
example, War Crimes consisting of violations of humanitarian law include not only 
unnecessary killing, but also non murderous crimes such as pillaging and unnecessary 
destruction of property.
42
  An examination of national law further undermines this 
argument as various crimes ranging from murder to petty theft are punished under 
domestic laws.
43
 The idea that only grave mass murder should be made illegal is not only 
unsound but defeats the entire purpose of human rights protections which aims safeguard 
all rights of people, not simply the right to life.
44
  The failure of the international 
community to protect cultural rights and cultural existence is not only disappointing but 
rather hypocritical when examining the other rights that have been enumerated and 
supported by various nations. An idealist view of rights protection and the criminalization 
process would state that the most heinous acts are criminalized and all people‟s rights are 
                                                     
41
 United Nations, Draft Convention of Genocide: Communications Received by the Secretary-General at § 
5 ¶ 7-8,  U.N. Doc. A/401 (27 September 1947), reprinted in 1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPA WEBB,  THE 
GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES  372 (2008).  
42
 See Generally Geneva Conventions, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135 available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS?OpenView. 
43
WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  8 (2d ed. 2009) (“ States ensure the protection of  
the right to live of individuals within their jurisdiction by such measures as the prohibition of murder in 
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protected. In reality, the Genocide Convention was drafted by states which focus on self 
interest and the result is not guaranteed to protect the rights of all individuals. This is 
where the debate about the state of Genocide Convention is absolutely necessary insofar 
as it allows the pin pointing of failures and creates a space for a dialogue which can direct 
the changes necessary to make the convention more effective. 
Although the reasoning during the drafting debates is more nuanced and complex 
than political interest, states were also influenced by their own self interest. Due to the 
evidence of self interest, their commitment to various human rights protections is 
illogical when analyzed against states refusal to include cultural genocide in the Genocide 
Convention. The rights enumerated in various international treaties and declarations 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, and ICESCR show a 
commitment by States to the protection of rights beyond the right to life.
45
 In order for 
these rights to be protected, it takes not only a declaration asking states  to protect those 
rights, but also a means of punishing those who violate those essential rights and laws as 
can be seen in prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It is 
evident by the international prosecution of these crimes that a simple declaration that asks 
states to protect rights is not sufficient to ensure their protection. 
It was also argued that cultural genocide dealt with human rights and should 
therefore be handled in minority rights treaties or declarations.  A major proponent of this 
argument was the United States, who stated that due to the gravity of creating a new 
crime of genocide, only barbarous acts should be considered and those acts considered to 
be cultural genocide should be dealt with in human rights treaties.
46
 France also, agreed 
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with the United States that cultural genocide should be included in minority protection 
and posited that including “cultural genocide invites the risk of political interference in 
the domestic affairs of States.”47 Agreeing with the United States and France, Poland and 
India stated that cultural genocide is a minority rights issue and that its inclusion in the 
convention would decrease its efficacy.
48
 The major pitfall of this argument is that it fails 
to take into account the importance of a means of punishment to ensure compliance with 
human rights doctrine. 
Although many states wanted to include cultural genocide, other states saw it as a 
sign that they could be open to prosecution because of their assimilation policies.
49
 New 
Zealand even argued that the United Nations could be charged with genocide because the 
Trusteeship Council stated that "the now existing tribal structure was an obstacle to the 
political and social advancement of the indigenous inhabitants."
50
 The inclusion of the 
cultural genocide article would greatly inhibit state practices as they often valued 
assimilation in order to create a cohesive nation. Venezuela argued that states may want 
to use an official language in the schools and that might be considered cultural genocide 
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unless there was a stricter definition.
51
  The representative from Brazil furthered the 
arguments against cultural genocide provisions by arguing that new states should not 
protect minority groups that may oppose assimilation efforts.
52
 The representative of 
Egypt preferred a narrower definition of genocide as he “ . . . expressed the fear that the 
concept of cultural genocide might hamper a reasonable policy of assimilation which no 
State aiming at national unity could be expected to renounce.”53 The most significant 
reason that states‟ refused to include an article on cultural genocide was to protect 
themselves from potential prosecution; knowing that some of their policies constituted 
cultural genocide. 
54
  All of these states exhibited a fear that their assimilationist practices 
would put them at risk for prosecution for cultural genocide. The states, however, did not 
take into account that the purpose of creating definitions of physical and cultural 
genocide was to prevent the destruction of a group.
55
 Furthermore, the dolus specialis 
component of genocide creates a threshold so that not every possible state or individual 
action can be labeled a genocidal act.
56
 
Even when it was posited that cultural genocide should be in a separate 
convention condemning the crime, the proposal was never considered seriously; it is 
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evident that states did not consider cultural genocide important enough to include in the 
Convention or even in a separate convention.
57
 Furthermore, states suggested different 
scenarios in which minor actions taken by governments could be seen as cultural 
genocide without addressing the seriousness of cultural genocide and the requirement of 
the intent to destroy a group. States did not analyze the act of cultural genocide parallel to 
the physical genocide in terms of the dolus specialis, special intent.
58
  Both cultural 
genocide and physical genocide are characterized by that special intent which means that 
in order for an act to be considered genocide outside of the specific acts committed, it 
must also be proven that there is an „intent to destroy [a group], in whole or in part . . .‟.59 
C. The Genocide Convention 
After much debate, the article on cultural genocide was not included in the 
Genocide Convention by a six to one vote.
60
 Despite the defeat of the article on cultural 
genocide, this did not erase remnants of cultural genocide from the convention. The 
offensive act of forcible transfer of children was considered cultural genocide and, "The 
provision is enigmatic because the drafters clearly rejected the concept of cultural 
genocide."
61
 The inclusion of the forcible transfer children is a problematic component of 
the Genocide Convention because it does not indicate any physical harm, the damage 
done is cultural.
62
 Even if the possibility exists that the group of children can be 
characterized based on the other groups protected in the Convention, the damage done is 
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not necessarily physical, which directly contradicts the argument states made stressing 
the importance of physical damage to genocide.
63
 Furthermore, in order to be considered 
genocide, the forced transfer of the children must be accompanied by the intent to destroy 
a particular group; this particular group may differ from the perpetrators based on 
ethnicity, religion, race, or nationality, which are all components of defining a distinct 
cultural group.
64
   
With cultural genocide excluded from the final draft, the negotiations resulted in the 
following text that defines genocide: 
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
65
  
The text of the convention protects four groups: national, ethnical, racial, and religious. 
The definition of genocide poses some major problems when it comes to protecting 
minorities and indigenous groups around the world. There are certain aspects of the 
convention that are antiquated and simply missing, which allows perpetrators to get away 
with massive violations. The first problem is in the list of protected groups. The 
convention protects racial groups, although it has currently been accepted that 'race' does 
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not exist as a scientific concept.
66
  The concept of race at the time of the drafting of the 
convention was broad and incorporated ethnicity as well, however in recent years, 
scientists and law makers have moved away from using race as a term to distinguish 
between groups.
67
 Another problem is that the convention leaves out cultural groups, 
which means that groups of people with shared values, languages, and customs which 
may need an increased protection, particularly in Latin America and Africa.
68
 Not only 
are the protected groups limited, but the entire definition is limited in scope which means 
that there are a number of situations that seem to be genocide but do not fit the definition 
provided.
69
 The fact that certain groups are not protected based on distinctions such as 
disability, sexual orientation, political orientation, or gender, would allow their 
destruction to potentially go unpunished to the fullest extent, "[i ]t would reprehensible if 
the world would not condemn massive slaughter of members of a group . . .  simply 
because of a preordained idea of what types of groups are qualified for coverage under 
the [Genocide] Convention."
70
  
The Genocide Convention also fails to criminalize the destruction of all possible 
groups by leaving out political and social groups. This prevents the condemnation of all 
acts that had the intent to destroy a group, for example the removal of Soviet civilians 
and the murder of homosexuals during the holocaust.
71
 The fact that so many groups are 
left outside of the scope of the convention means that they will have to turn to their 
respective national courts or tribunals for justice. However the crimes would not have the 
stigma of genocide attached to it.
72
  The problem with seeking justice at a national level 
is that if the genocidal plan is widespread, systematic and being perpetrated by the 
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government, then no legal recourse exists on a local level. These problems demonstrate 
the necessity for major changed within the Genocide Convention and the interpretation of 
genocide to ensure protection for groups. Furthermore, the lack of an inclusive definition 
of genocide means that more time is spent deciding whether something is technically 
genocide in instances where situations are dire.
73
 This means that courts are unable to 
make a decision about the genocidal nature of a situation, which can slow state action,   
The limited legal meaning of genocide has been stretched by some courts to better 
fit its rhetorical use. The consequence is a complex and uncertain law-Darfur 
burned and bled whilst a legal determination of genocide was awaited. The 
Genocide Convention describes with sufficient precision a single historical event, 
an unimaginable, unrepeatable evil. But, in its modern application, the Genocide 
Convention kills more people that it protects or prosecutes.
74
 
The Genocide Convention paralyzes the international community and allows individuals 
to go unpunished and allows crimes to continue which is antithetical to the entire idea of 
a Genocide Convention. The uncertainty of genocide law prevents the international 
community from labeling acts genocidal which limits the ability of the international 
community to hold states and specific individuals accountable for their actions. The lack 
of cohesive case law defining this crime and the fact that it leaves so many groups 
unprotected requires a revamping of the convention and of the definition of genocide in 
its entirety. The preceding reasons demonstrate the need to change the genocide 
convention in many aspects. The Convention is currently not sufficient to adequately 
protect many people from the currently defined genocidal acts as well as acts categorized 
as cultural genocide. 
                                                     
73
 Frank Chalk, ‘Genocide in the 20th Century’ Definitions of Genocide and Their Implications for 
Prediction and Prevention, 4 HOLOCAUST & GENOCIDE STUD. 149,151 (1989)(“ As David Hawk has noted, 
„The absence of “political groups” from the coverage of the Genocide Convention has unfortunately had 
the effect of diverting discussion from what to do to deter or remedy a concrete situation of mass killings 
into a debilitating, confusing debate over the question of whether a situation is “legally” genocide.‟ Many 
international human rights activists would agree with him. IT was the exclusion of political groups the 
definition of genocide in the Convention which led the International Commission of Jurists to rule that 
neither the killings in Equatorial Guinea Under Macais nor Pakistan‟s murders of members of the Awami 
League and the educated elite in Bangladesh were genocide. In the case of the Hindu dead, regarded as 
victims of genocide by the ICJ, Pakistani officials had declared that they were not killed as members of a 
religious group, but as „enemies of the state‟.”). 
74
Peter Quayle, Unimaginable Evil: The Legislative Limitations of the Genocide Convention, 5 Int'l Crim. 
L. Rev. 364,363 (2005). 
17 
 
 The lack of a provision for cultural genocide is surprising due to the fact that the 
States voted to include forced transfer of children as act to be included in the final 
convention.  The inclusion of forced transfer as a crime is puzzling due to the fact that is 
goes directly against major statements that the Convention should be focused on physical 
destruction. First, forced transfer results directly in a loss of culture immediately.
75
 
Children that are removed from their homes will be acculturated in a completely different 
environment and will lose ties to their language, religion, and entire cultural identity.
76
 
Furthermore, forced transfer does not directly lead to physical harm. 
77
 The 
Representative from Venezuela concluded that including the forced transfer of children 
as an act of genocide, 
  . . .  the Committee implicitly recognized that a group could be destroyed 
although the individual members of it continue to live normally without having 
suffered physical harm. Sub-paragraph 5 of article II had been adopted because 
the forced transfer of children to a group where they would be given an education 
different from that of their own group, and would have new customs, a new 
religion and probably a new language, was in practice tantamount to the 
destruction of their group, whose future depended on that generation of children. 
Such transfer might be made from a group with a low standard of civilization and 
living in conditions both unhealthy and primitive, to a highly civilized group as 
members of which the children would suffer no physical harm, and would indeed 
enjoy an existence which was materially much better; in such a case there would 
be no question of mass murder, mutilation, or torture or malnutrition; yet if the 
intent of the transfer were the destruction of the group, a crime of genocide would 
undoubtedly have been committed.
78
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 The inclusion of forced transfer of children counters the argument that the acts included 
in the convention must directly cause physical harm.
79
 This also demonstrates that states 
understood the importance of culture but were unable to weigh that against protection 
from prosecution based on their own practices. The fact that states could have been 
prosecuted for their own actions based on the proposed article of cultural genocide does 
not necessitate that it should not be criminalized. States have an irrational fear of 
prosecution as cultural genocide is distinct from assimilation and would only be aimed at 
drastic measures taken to destroy a group.
80
 Cultural genocide laws would not inhibit 
assimilation practices in so far as they are not an attempt to destroy a group; this is found 
in the special intent component of genocide.
81
 States that fear the criminalization of 
assimilation policies have not grasped the difference between that and cultural genocide, 
which is the intent to exterminate a groups‟ existence.82 
 The drafting of the Genocide Convention resulted in a legal text that is 
insufficient to protect groups from physical and non-physical forms of destruction. 
Analyzing the history of the Convention and the negotiations made during the drafting of 
the final text, it becomes evident that state interest played a significantly larger role in 
determining the definition of genocide than did the promise to protect groups from 
multiple forms of destruction. The beginning of the Genocide Convention, in General 
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Assembly Resolution 96(I) demonstrates and international consensus about the nature of 
genocide and the importance of protecting not only the lives of group members, but their 
cultural contributions as well.
83
 Furthermore, the remnants of cultural genocide left in the 
Convention via the criminalization of the forced transfer of children, demonstrates the 
importance of protecting culture and a group‟s existence as a distinct entity. This analysis 
creates the impetus to define and criminalize cultural genocide; as destroying a group‟s 
distinct characteristics destroys the group in its entirety. As long as cultural genocide 
remains an act without a punishment, the international community jeopardizes not only a 
group‟s existence, but the foundation of the human rights framework, that promises rights 
protections for all humans. 
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II. Culture, Law and Genocide  
This section seeks to analyze the relation between culture, law and genocide. The 
importance of culture has been demonstrated throughout the drafting of the Genocide 
Convention. However, this chapter seeks to define culture in a way that can provide clear 
legal standards for the creation of a definition of cultural genocide. 
 
 
 The drafting of the Genocide Convention demonstrates the complexity of state 
relationships and the power of state self interest.. The importance of culture is found not 
only in the General Assembly resolution, but also in the words of the states that were 
proponents of the article on cultural genocide.
84
 The importance of culture as an aspect of 
human uniqueness and its importance to social groups is evident; the loss of culture 
means that a group ceases to exist as a distinct group.
85
 Kurt Mundorff expounds upon 
this idea: 
A group is comprised of its individuals, but also of its history, traditions, the relation 
between the group members, and the relationship with other groups, etc. Even without 
moving into what can be described as cultural genocide it can certainly be argued that a 
group is destroyed already when its components, besides the physical lives of the group 
members, are eliminated.
86
 
 
This idea is central make to the formation of the concept of genocide, which requires that 
we understand culture as a component of „groups‟ listed in the Genocide Convention. 
These groups cannot be distinguished if there are not characteristics that make them 
different from surrounding peoples. In the creation of the Genocide Convention, this can 
be seen in the work of Raphael Lemkin, who emphasized that physical and cultural 
existence are  one in the same insofar as “ an attack on [a group‟s] physical existence is 
also an attack on its cultural existence , and vice versa.”87 
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 The importance of culture to the existence of a group, whether ethnical, national, 
religious, etc., brings about the creation of cultural rights on a national and international 
level.
88
 It is this combination of rights that ensures the ability of people to be different 
publicly and privately - that protects the existence of minority groups and allows them to 
shape their cultural identity.
89
 Understanding that these rights are essential is not simply 
enough to create the impetus to criminalizing cultural genocide. Culture shapes our world 
view, our view of human rights, our reasons for protecting human rights, and our fear of 
differing cultures.
90
  It is therefore necessary to understand what culture is and its 
components in order to reshape our thinking on cultural genocide and analyze the reasons 
as to why it was not included in the Genocide Convention. 
 The current human rights doctrine is based in a worldview perpetuated by 
powerful states, the arguable lack of sensitivity to other cultures comes from a one-sided 
view of the world.
91
 The West, in particular has had the leading role in developing the 
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current human rights regime.
92
 This view creates a cultural upbringing that tends to focus 
on the individual rather than the community and can also be seen in the way that these 
human rights are protected internationally.
93
 It is this view of human rights along with the 
rise of xenophobia which requires the protection of culture and cultural rights as to ensure 
the survival of distinct viewpoints, rich practices, and differing opinions.
94
 It is for these 
reasons that this section seeks to understand the components of culture, its relation to law, 
and its place in genocide law. 
A. Culture Defined 
  In seeking to create a cultural genocide law, one must begin with understanding 
culture. It is essential to understand what culture is and its components in order to create 
laws that protect such an abstract concept. The difficulty of cultural rights is in the 
definition of culture which constantly changes.
95
  This concept is not fully defined in 
international law nor is there a standard definition in anthropology. The concept of 
culture in anthropology differs across the spectrum, with definitions of culture ranging 
from morals and values to entire societal institutions.
96
 Some anthropologists believe 
culture is exclusively learned while other champion genetic influences.
97
 Some 
anthropologists argue that culture is exclusively ideas while others contend that culture 
consists of ideas and their associated activities.
98
 These arguments within the 
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anthropological community demonstrate the vagueness of the concept of culture. The 
lack of a standard definition of culture not only makes it harder to understand, but also 
lends credence to the view of culture as an intellectual abstraction, 
Despite the fact that we talk of culture as something “real”, as something that 
exists “out there”, culture is, in fact, an intellectual construct used for describing 
(and explaining) a complex cluster of human behaviors, ideas, emotions, and 
artifacts.
99
 
 
Starting from the idea that culture in its broad sense is an abstraction necessitates that we 
extrapolate from this concept, the components that allow people to see, experience, 
identify with, and intellectualize culture. 
 Despite a cohesive understanding of the specifics of culture, there is agreement on 
the basics of culture and how it manifests itself in groups.
100
 Broadly culture can be 
defined as a way of life, as patterns of living that controls social interactions.
101
 This way 
of life has its basis in ideas that are transmitted between people: this is the way the 
culture spreads and eventually guides an entire group of people.
102
 These ideas influence 
things such as religion, food, writing, art, music, and customs of marriage and 
relationships.
103
 The combination of these things creates a complex whole that include all 
beliefs, artifacts, and “products of human activity as determined by these habits.”104 This 
view of culture is used as it provides an understanding of the way in which cultural habits 
permeate a group. Furthermore, this understanding of culture provides a basic foundation 
for the exploration of culture as it relates to groups and the creation of cultural law and 
genocide law. 
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It also recognized that culture is not stagnate and not all in culture is shared.
105
 
Many members in a community do not necessarily agree about every single practice 
within a particular culture; however the overarching ideals tend to be passed on because 
they help perpetuate the way of life of the group.
106
  The impact of the inconsistency of 
culture is that although there are general ideas and practices that permeate a specific 
group and that distinguish them from another distinct group; culture is fluid and 
constantly changing or evolving. Culture is also not consistent within a particular cultural 
group itself, as certain aspects of culture may not be evident in every member of that 
particular group. The lack of the constant existence of culture in every member of a group 
lends itself to the idea that culture abstract and difficult to define. The impact of this is 
that the intellectual abstraction of culture is not something on which law can be based as 
it is fluid and inconsistent. Therefore, law can be based, not on the idea of culture, but 
rather cultural components that are more tangible and easily understood; thereby creating 
the possibility of clear legal brightlines and standards. 
Law has to outline the components of culture in order to create a legal framework 
in which to protect culture. Creating laws that simply say to protect culture provides no 
clear roadmap for international or state action. Furthermore, the vagueness of the 
abstraction that is simply “culture” allows for states to interpret it differently, which does 
not result in a universal and equal protection of rights for all. For example, one of the 
most conspicuous aspects of culture is language. Language and culture are linked and 
interdependent insofar as languages define the social group and the language depends on 
the perpetuation of the group‟s way of life and continuation of the culture for survival.107 
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The importance of language is seen in the way that language shapes our world view and 
explains the world around us.
108
 This means that groups with different languages are 
likely to have different outlooks.
109
 The example of language provides a framework with 
which law can evaluate language in order to protect it. Law must seek tangible aspects 
that are essential when distinguishing between groups and that are essential to the 
existence and integrity of a specific group. This allows laws to be created that specifically 
detail the necessary actions states should take in order to protect cultural components and 
thus culture as an ideal. 
B. Culture and Law 
In the previous chapter, the details of the negotiations during the drafting of the 
Genocide Convention highlight the particular arguments that were used to keep the 
cultural genocide article out of the final draft. One of those arguments contended that 
cultural genocide should be relegated to the realm of human rights, in particular minority 
rights.
110
 Although cultural genocide was not criminalized in the Genocide Convention, 
existing cultural protection exists in the form of human rights treaties and agreements. 
These existing cultural protections provide the framework for the international 
understanding of cultural rights. In the realm of international law, the priority is not with 
understanding the abstraction that is the idea of culture. Unlike in anthropology, 
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understanding culture in a legal framework requires that we focus on the components of 
culture, 
[sic]  it is not necessary to define the concept of „culture‟ itself, it is necessary, at least in 
general terms, to identify the components of „culture‟ or „cultural life‟ as protected by the 
standards in order to delineate their content and associated state obligations.
111
 
 
International instruments need to provide clear standards to which states can adhere. In 
order to provide these clear standards, the human rights framework should not use the 
vague construct of culture. The impact of this is that cultural law in the human rights 
framework tends to protect cultural components and is characterized by a more 
characteristic-focused approach to culture rather than the exploratory view of culture held 
by anthropologists. 
 There are many definitions of culture in international law; however, within the 
framework of the United Nations, there are essentially three levels at which cultural 
rights are examined.
112
 The first is the level is the material aspects of culture including 
artifacts; the second level includes the artistic and scientific creations of a particular 
culture; and finally,  
Culture in its anthropological sense, i.e. culture as a way of life or, in UNESCO‟s 
words, the “set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of 
society or a social group”; it encompasses “in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, 
ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs”. In this system-oriented 
understanding of culture, the individual is seen as a product of a cultural system.
113
 
 
This functional view of culture is essential due to the fact that the international 
community cannot “protect” every single aspect of culture as forces outside of the natural 
change in culture, such as globalization, can have a profound impact on the integrity of a 
specific culture. In the instance of culture law has to differentiate between essential and 
non-essential rights in order to determine which aspects need to be protected.
114
 The 
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concept of culture is extremely complex and definitions vary, and the list of components 
of culture can be infinite, therefore law must look to the “essential” components of 
culture in order to create a clear legal standard that is enforceable and effective. This 
view of culture is the dominant view in the international legal perspective of culture. This 
view of culture creates rights that protect specific features of a culture, those that strongly 
contribute to the cultural identity of a group, such as language.
115
 
 
 1. UNESCO and Culture Defined 
 The key organization in protection culture is the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO is the promoter of 
international diversity, and, therefore, its research and programs are extremely influential 
in the creation of laws protecting culture. UNESCO defines culture in many different 
ways according to different qualities.  These include intangible culture, cultural 
patrimony, cultural heritage, cultural content, and cultural expressions; all of which 
provide the framework for the creation of cultural law.
116
 The framework begins with 
cultural heritage, the overarching broad concept that includes all manifestations of a 
particular culture which have been inherited.
117
 Next, intangible cultural heritage, 
UNESCO defines this as the “practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – 
as well as the instruments, objects, artifacts and cultural spaces” belonging to a specific 
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culture.
118
 UNESCO states that these are passed throughout generations, and this is what 
provides or creates the sense of cultural identity.
119
  This overarching idea of intangible 
cultural heritage is one part of what makes the group distinct.  
A part of this intangible heritage is the cultural patrimony of a group. Cultural 
patrimony is defined as that which is so fundamental to a group that it is inalienable from 
it.
120
 Cultural patrimony, as with intangible cultural heritage, includes artifacts as well as 
folklore and language.
121
 Also distinct from these aspects are the ideas of cultural content 
and cultural expression. UNESCO adopted a Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expression in which it defines the difference between 
the two.
122
  Cultural content deals specifically with symbolism and artistic aspects that 
express culture, whereas cultural expressions are those that come from the creativity of 
people or groups that have cultural content, for example cultural content consists of the 
values and symbolism of a society, whereas a cultural expression would be music, poetry 
or theater of that particular society.
123
 This heavily detailed view of culture allows 
UNESCO to provide clear guidelines as to what should be protected and what actions s 
should take in order to fulfill their obligations. Furthermore, these definitions provide the 
framework of cultural law, as the previous definitions determine the relationship between 
groups as culture; cultural law refers specifically to the interaction between culture and 
the law.
124
 
A delicate balance is needed in order to combine the need for clear legal standards 
with the abstract nature of culture. Therefore, culture needs to be broken down into 
components that law can protect, as the term „culture‟ is too vague to protect as a whole. 
This is seen in the work of UNESCO, which strives to protect culture as a whole, but 
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breaks the idea of culture down into protectable components. For example, UNESCO 
lists the items considered cultural heritage and they include, but are not limited to: 
monuments, architectural works, inscriptions, cave dwellings, buildings, and 
archeological sites.
125
 In order for UNESCO to adequately protect culture it has to draft 
conventions that created clear legal standards. In an effort to protect culture in its entirety, 
UNESCO created a definition of cultural heritage that would list protectable components. 
 
2. Cultural Protection Obligations in Treaties 
Culture and law are inseparable because “ law embodies culture and formalizes its 
norms, law promotes, protects, conditions, and limits cultural attributes and expressions, 
law harmonizes cross-cultural differences , . . .  culture reinforces legal rules, [and] 
culture conditions [sic] the adoption, interpretation, and vitality of legal rules.”126 The 
symbiotic nature between culture and law demonstrates generally that the two cannot 
exist without each other. It is the changes in law and changes in culture that allow for the 
creation of new rules and new norms that can provide human rights protections. Cultural 
law has its beginnings in The Hague Conferences in which regulations were codified that 
protected cultural heritage in times of war.
127
  The formation of this law throughout 
modern times created international instruments that speak of culture in terms of rights; 
rights which are guaranteed regardless of the person and has been construed to provide 
protection of culture for all groups including indigenous peoples.
128
 These rights can be 
interpreted in a way that creates a myriad of protections and rights including rights to 
traditional activities, rights to live in reserves.
129
 Furthermore, the rights in cultural law 
can be extrapolated to create positive legal obligations to ensure that people of different 
cultures not only have cultural freedom, but also have the ability to participate in 
decisions that affect them.
130
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 The international framework that protects culture consists of conventions and 
agreements that create state obligations. The evolution of cultural law begins with the 
earliest agreements – the Roerich Pact in 1935 and the Hague Conventions.131 The 
Roerich Pact focused on the protection of monument in the Western Hemisphere and the 
Hague Conventions provided protections for cultural heritage in times of armed 
conflict.
132
  The Hague conventions protect against seizure, pillage, and damage to 
cultural heritage. However they did not provide protection in peaceful times and the 
Roerich Pact did not provide a universal standard of protection.
133
 The lack of a universal 
standard of protection and value of cultural heritage gave birth to the expansion of the 
cultural protection regime. There are many treaties that protect cultural heritage, 
including, but not limited to: the UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and natural Heritage, the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expression, and the UNESCO Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. These conventions create the 
foundation from which lawmakers can understand culture, can manage state obligations, 
and can help shape the framework of a definition of cultural genocide. The definition of 
cultural genocide, in order to be accepted, should be couched in an accepted precedent of 
the international concept of culture and cultural protections. This ensures that states will 
be more willing to embrace the criminalization of cultural genocide as they are already 
bound to protect culture in a similar fashion through other agreements. 
The analysis of the current cultural protection regime begins with the Declaration 
of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation. This declaration from UNESCO 
is the cornerstone of cultural heritage protection. The declaration states first and foremost 
that the “wide diffusion of culture and the education of humanity for justice and liberty 
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and peace are indispensible to the dignity of man.”134 Immediately this makes culture and 
inalienable right t as it is essential to the existence of human and human dignity. 
Furthermore, Article 1 states that ever culture has a value that must be preserved and that 
every person has the right to develop their culture.
135
 Secondly, this declaration states that 
the existence of different cultures and the dissemination of ideas across cultures “. . .  is 
essential to creative activity, [and] the pursuit of truth.”136 The impact of this declaration 
is three- fold: first, it creates an undeniable link between the progression of man and the 
protection of culture; secondly, it demonstrates the importance of different viewpoints in 
order to facilitate intellectual growth; and finally, it creates an impetus for international 
coordination and in the protection and preservation of cultural heritage.   
Despite the importance of the declaration in framing the international view of 
cultural protection, it lacks a strong enforcement mechanism and does not create clear 
state obligations. The lack of an enforcement mechanism is a recurring them in the 
treaties concerning cultural heritage. The lack of a punishment for acting contrary to state 
obligations or even acting to destroy a particular culture means that states have no reason 
to actively protect cultural heritage. This makes the criminalization of cultural genocide 
even more important as it provides the essential enforcement mechanism that cannot be 
provided by conventions and declarations. This is especially important as the link 
between man and culture necessitates protection and specifically requires laws that can be 
enforced. The lack on an enforcement mechanism evident in cultural protection 
conventions can be mitigated by a definition of cultural genocide that would provide 
individual criminal responsibility and more state accountability for cultural destruction. 
Another convention that is important to the cultural protection regime is The 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer Ownership of Cultural Property, and it has a more practical purpose. Similar to 
the International Cultural Co-operational Declaration, this convention espouses the 
importance of international cooperation for the protection of cultural heritage. However, 
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practically it created “multilateral control over the movement of cultural property” and it 
specifies specific aspects of cultural and archaeological importance that ought to be 
protected by states in cooperation.
137
 The impact of this convention is not simply 
regulations on the transfer of cultural heritage; this creates clear state obligations in 
protecting and maintaining its own cultural heritage as well as the heritage of other 
states.
138
 Furthermore, it also gives a detailed list of specific natural and man-made 
artifacts and expressions of culture, archaeology, and natural history that need to be 
protected. This list can serve as a starting point to determine what aspects of culture 
should be protected in a law criminalizing cultural genocide and can and will be 
instrumental in forming the actus reus of the crime. Once again however, there is no 
article that laws out the roadmap for states that have violated their obligations. There are 
no guidelines for punishment, outside of normal state to state means that would punish 
violators, or what should be done to protect the endangered aspects of culture from 
further damage. 
 Another convention that provides a deeper understanding of the cultural heritage 
protection regime is the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage. This convention created the World Heritage list and the parties to the 
Convention agree to maintain these sites of valuable cultural heritage and create plans for 
sustainable tourism.
139
 This convention is especially important as it explains the threat to 
cultural heritage and the importance of maintaining these aspects of cultural heritage for 
future generations. In particular, the convention takes into consideration, 
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“[sic] the existing international conventions, recommendations, and resolutions 
concerning cultural and natural property demonstrate the importance for all the peoples of 
the world, of safeguarding this unique and irreplaceable property, to whatever people it 
may belong.”140 
 
This convention requires states to create legislation to maintain and protect their cultural 
heritage sites nationally.
141
 Furthermore, this convention requires international 
cooperation in the protection of cultural heritage by creating a committee that would 
provide assistance as needed by states for cultural heritage protection.
142
 This 
requirement for international intervention or assistance in order to protect culture is 
important for two reasons: first, it puts the responsibility of the protection of cultural 
heritage on all states, and secondly, it elevates the impact of cultural destruction from a 
group level or national level to an international level. This elevation means that the loss 
of culture has an impact on the entire world. It is not simply an affront to a specific 
group, but it is a crime against all of humanity. This elevation is similar to the elevation 
of genocide insofar as states recognize that the barbarity of the crime does not just impact 
the group targeted, but it impacts the entire world. 
 Another important document is the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity. Even though this is not a binding convention it explains the importance of 
cultural diversity and its impact on the world as a whole.
143
 This declaration states that 
respect for cultural diversity aids in the guarantee of international peace and that cultural 
pluralism is essential to the democratic framework.
144
 What is arguably most important in 
regards to cultural genocide is the analysis in the declaration that makes human rights and 
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cultural rights indivisible.
145
 This declaration states that cultural protections are also a 
commitment to human rights and furthermore, cultural rights are an important component 
of human rights in general.
146
 In failing to protect cultural rights, one is also failing to 
protect human rights and vice versa. Another important document is the Convention on 
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression. As a recent 
convention, it draws upon the spirit of previous conventions on the protection of cultural 
heritage and explains the value and importance of culture and culture expressions to the 
free flow of ideas and exchange of knowledge.
147
 This convention seeks to protect all 
cultures and “the free flow of diverse ideas, words, and images.”148 Particularly striking is 
Article 4 which reads, 
“The defence of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for 
human dignity. It implies a commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, in 
particular the rights of persons belonging to minorities and those of indigenous 
peoples.”149  
 
This article removes the idea of law from the necessity of promoting cultural rights; the 
protection of cultural rights is no longer something states are legally obligated to do, but 
it is also something they are ethically and morally obligated to do. 
 
3. Cultural Protection as a Duty 
 This ethical and moral obligation exists independent of the legal obligation; 
however it is the ethical obligation that gives rise to the legal one. Despite opposition 
from states about the protection of cultural rights and downright denial for the 
criminalization of cultural genocide, states are ethically obligated to protect cultural 
rights. The sphere of cultural rights protection consists not only of international 
organizations such as UNESCO, but also exists within the human rights framework and 
requires states to take specific positive actions in order to ensure the promotion and 
protection of those rights. Similar to the right to life, individuals also have the right to 
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participate in cultural life.
150
 Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is the right to take part in cultural life; it also 
“indicates the importance of the principle of participation in the enjoyment of cultural 
rights. This encompasses both the right to have access to a cultural life and to participate 
in that cultural life.”151 
 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights explains the importance 
of cultural rights by stating that the ability to participate in cultural life is interdependent 
on other rights enshrined in the ICESCR.
152
 This also imposes on states two obligations 
in order to ensure its protection: it requires abstention, meaning non-interference in 
cultural practices and the exchange of cultural goods, as well as positive actions to ensure 
access to and preservation of cultural heritage.
153
 In terms of accountability, the 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural states that alleged violations will be 
investigated and that the results will be publicized.
154
 This particular convention does not 
allow individual complaints, so there is no option for the individual to claim a violation 
directly to the committee. The lack of an individual complaint mechanism prevents states 
from being held fully accountable for all violations; it also denies individual victims 
access to justice as they are forced to see „local‟ solutions for their rights violations. 
 Furthermore, if we look to other conventions that allow individual complaints, 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, if the committee 
concludes that your rights have been violated a state has three months to show it has 
remedied the situation and the examples offered include granting compensation or release 
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from detention.
155
Once again, international conventions fail to offer a real remedy that 
would be effective in curbing the destruction of culture. Furthermore, a remedy of 
compensation would fail to equate to the loss of cultural diversity. The payment of 
compensation is retroactive and would not be able to replace the major aspects of a 
culture that have been effectively destroyed, depending on whether a culture was 
destroyed partly or in its entirety.  
With conventions lacking individual complaint mechanisms, requiring 
compensation, or a promise of compensation or attempts to redress a violation, they lack 
a strong enforcement mechanism. However, what these conventions do provide are 
descriptions of the obligations states have in the regime of cultural rights. An 
understanding of these obligations serves as the foundation for the reasons that cultural 
genocide should be criminalized. Specifically, in the cultural rights regime, there are 
three distinct components of state obligation, 
Three elements of obligation with regard to the right to take part in cultural life can be 
identified: recognition, protection, and promotion of cultural identity. At the most basic 
level, the state has an obligation to recognize (if not endorse) the existence of different 
cultures, and ensure the right of individuals to take part in that cultural life and the 
components of that right. This may require more than a policy of non-interference and 
inaction. If the entitlement is to be meaningful as a human right, then it is not enough 
merely to refrain from hindering the enjoyment of cultural rights by persons belonging to 
minorities.
156
 
 
These components of obligation create a space in which cultural expression is not only 
protected but maximized. The existence of these obligations to protect cultural heritage 
demonstrate the importance of cultural diversity to the human experience. There is no 
significant difference in state obligations between the protection of culture and the 
criminalization of culture genocide. The difference however, is in the international 
recognition of crime, but also in the different enforcement mechanisms. In the current 
regime that is convention based, states simply have to prove that they are attempting to 
remedy the situation, whereas the criminalization of cultural genocide would provide a 
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legal remedy and punishment for those who attempt to destroy a culture „in whole or in 
part‟.157 
 
C. Culture and Genocide 
           In the previous chapter, the creation of the Genocide Convention was chronicled 
and analyzed. The process by which the Genocide Convention was created ultimately 
resulted in the deletion of the cultural genocide article from the final draft.
158
  The result 
of this deletion is that cultural protections have been relocated to the realm of human 
rights protections. However, very little attention is paid to cultural rights outside of the 
work of UNESCO, and within UNESCO there are no major enforcement mechanisms.
159
 
Although the work of UNESCO and other organizations have been very successful in the 
protection of aspects of cultural heritage, it still lacks the major enforcement mechanisms 
to punish states that attempt to destroy particular cultures or cultural components. While 
cultural genocide was being debated in the committees drafting the Genocide 
Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was also being drafted, and, 
therefore, was supposed to address aspects of cultural genocide and provide for that 
protection where the Genocide Convention would not.
160
 
 There are many acts which destroy a groups‟ culture that can give rise to the 
destruction of the group itself. For example, one of the key components of culture is 
language and history has shown that linguistic pluralism can be seen as a threat to 
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society, assimilation and ultimately homogenization.
161
  During times of war, leaders 
often persecute those who are culturally, linguistically related to the enemy of that time. 
162
 Linguisitic pluralism is often feared, 
Individuals and societies often feel threatened by linguistic pluralism. The confusion of 
other languages is therefore often viewed not simply as a problem but also as an actual 
danger to society. . .  In modern times members of minority groups who continue to 
speak their first languages may be viewed in more secular terms as a threat to the larger 
community of a magnitude that requires political or legal response. During time of war or 
other national emergency, in particular, leaders sometimes attack particular foreign 
languages because of the symbolic identities of those languages with enemies.
163
 
 In the United States, there was an Anti-German movement during World War I.
164
 This 
is not the only instance of persecution based on culture and would not amount to cultural 
genocide, but it demonstrates a pattern of attempts at cultural suppression and destruction 
which requires stronger protections for cultural components.
165
  Another instance in 
which culture can be destroyed is through education, particularly state controlled public 
education.
166
 Public education can shape history in such a way that it excludes parts that 
it deems inappropriate or even reinforce negative stereotypes about cultures and 
emphasize their supposed inferiority in order to get rid of the culture completely.
167
 For 
example, in New Zealand, Maori children were physically beaten for speaking their 
language at school until the 1950‟s.168 Although, this only represents a single practice in a 
single country, it demonstrates the enormous power of a state to infiltrate all aspects of 
life in order to get rid of a culture it deems inappropriate or inferior.  
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Furthermore, in 1997 the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission determined that the forcible transfer of Aboriginal children to non-
indigenous institutions and families constituted a form of cultural genocide.
169
 The 
government took legal guardianship of all Aboriginal children and removed them from 
their homes in order to assimilate them into European culture and society.
170
 Similar to 
genocide, the lack of a large number of cases that can be defined as cultural genocide 
does not exclude it from being labeled a crime. Whether or not a crime is prevalent 
should not dictate whether or not it is criminalized, whether or not a crime is committed 
once or a million times, it is a violation of rights and should be punished, especially when 
dealing with something as grave as the attempted destruction of a cultural group. There is 
a void in international law that allows the destruction of cultures to go unpunished; the 
criminalization of cultural genocide can provide the necessary state accountability to 
ensure rights protection. 
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III. Defining Cultural Genocide 
This section analyzes the necessity of a definition of cultural genocide. The definition of 
cultural genocide that is created draws inspiration from the work of Raphael Lemkin, the 
drafting of the Genocide Convention, and anthropological and legal views of culture. 
 
A. The Necessity of a Definition 
The problems with the current definition of Genocide require that the international 
community makes changes in order to protect minority groups. The importance of culture 
to our existence is even noted by the drafting committee, 
The cultural bond was one of the most factors among those which united a national group and 
that was so true that it was possible to wipe out a human group, as such, by destroying its 
cultural heritage, while allowing the individual members of a group to survive. The physical 
destruction of individuals was not the only possible form of genocide; it was not the 
indispensable condition of that crime.
171 
Culture is an integral part of our lives and it is one of the major ways that groups are 
distinguished. To deny this essential component of diversity is to be complicit in the 
destruction of people's customs, values, religions, and ways of life. The current definition 
of genocide is shaped by politics and self-interest and the resulting document is one that 
is good at gaining signatories but insufficient at saving lives.
172
 The inclusion of the 
forcible transfer of children as an offensive act demonstrates that cultural and physical 
genocide are inextricably linked. 
173
 
 The convention itself and the preparatory works demonstrate the importance of 
culture. This is also true in the application of the law, as trial chambers have also 
explained the importance of culture and the link between cultural and physical 
destruction. In the Kristic decision, the court found that the Serb forced knew that 
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missing generations of men would impact the survival of a patriarchal society.
174
 By 
recognizing the patriarchal make up of society, the tribunal recognized how culture 
affects a group's existence.
175
 Specifically, attacking leadership does not physically 
destroy the group immediately but rather, "[the perpetrator intends] to weaken the group 
culturally, thereby facilitating its ultimate destruction."
176
 This idea is also presented in 
the Blagojevic decision when the Trial Chamber notes, 
[T]he physical or biological destruction of a group is not necessarily the death of the 
group members. While killing large numbers of a group may be the most direct means of 
destroying a group, other acts or series of acts, can also lead to the destruction of the 
group.
177 
The Trial Chamber was analyzing the situation surround forced deportations and found 
that even though acts don‟t necessarily cause death, they can be genocide when 
conducted with the intent to destroy the group as a 'separate and distinct entity'.
178
  
The varying expansions of the current definition in different courts, demonstrates 
the need to reinterpret the definition of genocide.
179
 The result is distinct crimes that can 
be applied universally to all instances of genocide without having to be re-interpreted to 
convict perpetrators of crimes that may not be specified in the current convention. 
Although some states fear an „expansion‟ of the definition of genocide,  a restrictive 
approach to defining genocide fails to account for differences between current genocides 
and The Holocaust. The Holocaust was important part of the drafting of the Genocide 
Convention, however included in the purpose of the Genocide Convention was the 
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prevention of future genocides.  The current definition of cultural genocide is insufficient 
insofar as it fails to protect groups from non-physical means of destruction. The fear of 
expanding the definition of genocide and  losing the impact of the term is negated by the 
fact that both physical and cultural genocide are the same insofar as they seek the 
destruction of a group „in whole or in part.'180 Genocide whether physical or cultural is a 
persecutory crime, where victims are targeted because of their membership in a distinct 
group that the perpetrator wishes to destroy.
181
 The Genocide Convention was created in 
an environment where states wanted to condemn the acts of Nazi Germany while creating 
a definition that would prevent future acts. 
182
The political nature surrounding the 
creation of the Genocide Convention resulted in a definition reminiscent of the atrocities 
that occurred in Nazi Germany but failed to provide protection to all groups from 
destruction.  Restricting the definition to acts that are similar to the Holocaust requires 
answering extremely difficult questions and setting arbitrary brightlines. The idea of 
destroying a distinct group as stated during the drafting is a „supreme crime against 
humanity‟183 and this requires the criminalization of the non-physical form of that 
destruction. 
The reasons for excluding cultural genocide from the Genocide Convention 
included putting the protection of culture in the sphere of human rights, however pushing 
cultural genocide into the realm of "human rights issues" fails to provide an 
accountability mechanism that would ensure justice is served.
184
 A simple look at the 
accountability mechanisms in human rights treaties demonstrates the lack of a sufficient 
punishment especially when dealing with such grave crimes.  Firstly, the international 
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system is solely based on state cooperation, states will only agree to minimal restrictions 
on their sovereignty.
185
 Ratifying a treaty expresses consent to be bound to that treaty and 
the result is an international system that works on good will and treaties end up lacking 
the necessary “teeth” to ensure strict enforcement.186 The implementation, or lack thereof, 
of these treaties is a concern, 
Implementation is a key problem in making the system of international protection of 
human rights effective, and it has proved difficult and troublesome. The jurisdiction of 
international courts depends upon the consent of the states involved, and few states have 
given such consent with respect to disputes involving human rights. . .  Consequently, 
international human rights law like all international law, must rely heavily on voluntary 
compliance by states, buttressed by such moral and other influence other countries 
prepared to exert.
187
 
 
The necessity for state cooperation means that human rights treaties are unable to do 
much besides provide advice or make recommendations. The creation of international 
criminal courts and tribunals establishes the possibility for holding individuals 
responsible for the actions they take instead of simply making a written recommendation 
to a state. These human rights treaties which are supposed to guarantee compliance once 
they have been ratified have few means to ensure that states fulfill their obligations.  
The enforcement mechanisms vary throughout international forums and there are 
spaces for interstate and individual complaints.
188
  In relation to specific human rights 
treaties, enforcement mechanisms are very similar. The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, it allows individuals to submit complaints to the Human Rights 
Committee, and that ability comes through the optional protocol, not the original 
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convention itself.
189
 The Human Rights Committee after evaluating a claim, they offer 
their recommendations and they call upon states to take the necessary steps to ensure the 
observance of the ICCPR.
190
 These steps can include ensuring that future violations don‟t 
occur or even compensation to the victims for any harms suffered.
191
  However, due to 
increasing pressure from victims, the Human Rights Committee adopted new measures 
that would require reports within 180 days from states that have been found to have 
violated the ICCPR as to what steps they have taken to comply with the 
recommendations of the Committee.
192
 This change seems to important due to the fact a 
deadline of 180 days was now in place, however once those 180 days expired, there were 
no other actions that could be taken by the Committee. The problem with the efficacy of 
this mechanism, or the lack thereof, is that there is not any actual punishment for those 
who have violated the ICCPR, other that receiving a finger wagging from the Committee. 
Submitting a report to a Committee about steps taken does nothing to ensure that the 
grave violations of rights stop or that those who perpetrated said violations are held 
accountable. 
Outside of various treaty mechanisms, the United Nations itself has specific 
enforcement mechanisms including the 1503 procedure and engaging a specific 
rapporteur to research and report on specific violations.
193
 This however, still fails to 
provide individual accountability for the grave violations that occur during cultural 
genocide.  Similarly to UNESCO, which serves as the major organization for the 
protection of culture, there is no individual accountability but rather a dependence on 
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reporting.
194
 UNESCO relies strongly on friendly settlement and does not have „strong 
investigatory or oversight mechanism‟.195 The inability of UNESCO to prevent cultural 
genocide or even punish those who are active participants is a travesty. The importance 
of individual criminal responsibility is evident of international courts and tribunals, which 
demonstrate the need to hold people accountable for massive rights violations. The 
logical conclusion of the creation of the international courts and tribunals and their 
growing importance is that the international community feels that it is vital to hold 
individuals accountable for massive rights violations. With this as the foundation, it can 
also be applied to the concept of cultural genocide insofar as the result is a massive 
violation of rights that impacts not only the group targeted but all of humanity. 
Furthermore, the definition of genocide poses some major problems when it 
comes to protecting minorities and indigenous groups around the world. There are certain 
aspects of the convention that are antiquated and simply missing that allows perpetrators 
to get away with massive violations. The first problem is in the list of protected groups. 
The convention protects racial groups, although it has currently been accepted that 'race' 
does not exist as a scientific concept.
196
  Another problem is that the convention leaves 
out cultural groups, which means that groups of people with shared values, languages, 
and customs which may need an increased protection, particularly in Latin America and 
Africa.
197
 Not only are the protected groups limited, but the entire definition is limited in 
scope which means that there are a number of situations that seem to be genocide but do 
not fit the definition provided.
198
 The fact that certain groups are not protected would 
allow their destruction to potentially go unpunished to the fullest extent, "[i ]t would 
reprehensible if the world would not condemn massive slaughter of members of a group . 
. .  simply because of a preordained idea of what types of groups are qualified for 
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coverage under the [Genocide] Convention."
199
 Not only that, the convention also leaves 
out political and social groups which does not allow for all actions to be condemned, 
specifically the removal of Soviet civilians and the murder of homosexuals during the 
holocaust.
200
 The fact that so many groups are left outside of the scope of the convention 
means that they will have to turn to their respective national courts or tribunals for 
justice, however the crimes would not have the stigma of genocide attached to it.
201
 The 
problem with seeking justice at a national level is that if the genocidal plan is widespread 
and systematic and being perpetrated by the government, then no legal recourse exists on 
a local level. 
 The definition of genocide leaves the courts unable to make a decision about the 
genocidal nature of a situation, which chills state action,   
The limited legal meaning of genocide has been stretched by some courts to better 
fit its rhetorical use. The consequence is a complex and uncertain law-Darfur 
burned and bled whilst a legal determination of genocide was awaited. The 
Genocide Convention describes with sufficient precision a single historical event, 
an unimaginable, unrepeatable evil. But, in its modern application, the Genocide 
Convention kills more people that it protects or prosecutes.
202
 
The Genocide Convention stalls the international action and allows people to go 
unpunished and allows crimes to continue which is antithetical to the entire idea of a 
Genocide Convention. The lack of cohesive case law defining this crime and the fact that 
it leaves so many groups unprotected necessitates, in my view, a revamping of the 
convention and of the definition of genocide in its entirety. Looking at the convention 
from two different angles, the need for change exists and this is apparent in both the 
definition and the application of the law. The absence of cultural genocide from the 
Genocide Convention and the inability of human rights treaties to pick up the pieces left 
behind by the Convention leaves a gaping hole in international law and cultural rights 
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protection. Not only has that, but the inherent problems in the current definition of 
genocide demonstrate the importance of legal flexibility in its use in applying the law to 
different violations.   
The final problem is the Genocide Convention‟s focus on physical means of 
destruction. This focus necessitates a separate definition of cultural genocide instead of 
the addition of „cultural groups‟ to the current definition. The lack of the criminalization 
of non-physical means of destructions leaves groups vulnerable to a type of destruction 
that is part and parcel of a physical genocide plan but can also exist separately from a 
physical genocidal plan. This protection would not be achieved by creating a new 
category of „group‟ in the current definition of genocide. The difference between the 
current definition of genocide and the proposed definition of cultural genocide is in the 
acta rea, the criminalized acts. An addition of the category of „cultural groups‟ to the 
current definition of genocide would fail to adequately address the non-physical means of 
destructions associated with cultural genocide. The roots of the differentiation in the acta 
rea of physical and cultural genocide can be seen not only in the work of Raphael 
Lemkin but also in the proposed definitions of cultural genocide in the drafting of the 
Genocide Convention.
203
 The definitions presented during the drafting of the Genocide 
Convention took into consideration the major differences between physical and cultural 
genocide in terms of the means of destruction. Therefore, a definition of cultural 
genocide necessitates a separate list of acts that includes non-physical means of 
destruction currently missing from the current definition of genocide, which focuses 
mainly on physical destruction. The importance of culture to the human experience 
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necessitates individual criminal responsibility especially when there is a systematic plan 
to destroy a group „in whole or in part‟.204 
B. Framing a Definition of Cultural Genocide 
Understanding the complexities of the definition of genocide does not give us a 
starting point to frame a definition of cultural genocide. In order to frame a working 
definition of cultural genocide, an examination of culture needs to be undertaken.  
Culture can be broadly defined,". . . learned and shared human patterns or models for 
living: day to day living patterns. These patterns and models pervade all aspects of 
human social interaction. Culture is mankind's primary adaptive mechanism.'
205
 It can 
also be defined as "the material and ideological ways in which a group organizes, 
understands, and reproduces its life as a group."
206
 The important aspects of culture are 
language, religion, food, customs, and all are essential in defining a distinct group.  In 
order to create a functioning definition of cultural genocide, it is necessary to understand 
the two parts of the term: culture and genocide. As stated in the previous chapter, culture, 
for legal purposes, needs to be moved from an intellectual abstraction to a definition 
characterized by components so that law can create a clear framework of protections. The 
second part of the term, genocide, is necessary to understand because the principles 
guiding this definition will be applied to the definition of cultural genocide. The reason 
for this is that the definition of genocide as found in the Genocide Convention is 
internationally accepted and applied as law. Furthermore, it provides understanding into 
the world of special intent that is required for findings of genocide.  Since cultural 
genocide also deals with acts intending to destroy a group, the same special intent is 
required. 
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 An open definition of genocide is essentially “a form of one-sided mass killing in 
which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group.” 207 This very basic definition 
of genocide clarifies the essence of genocide as a crime. The lynchpin of the entire 
concept of genocide which separates it from simple murder or extermination as a war 
crime is the specific intent to destroy a group. The definition of Genocide has two parts 
essentially; the mens rea and the actus reus, 
The prosecution must prove specific material facts, but must also establish the accused‟s 
criminal intent or „guilty mind‟: actus non facit reum nisi mins sit rea. The definition of genocide 
in the 1948 Convention invites this analysis, because it rather neatly separates the two elements. 
The intital phrase or chapeau of article II addresses the mens rea of the crime of genocide, that is, 
the „intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such‟. 
The five sub-paragraphs of article II list the criminal acts or actus reus. The distinction between 
actus reus and mens rea features in virtually all of the judgments of the international tribunals 
that concern charges of genocide. It has even been extended into the realm of State 
responsibility.
208
 
Beginning with the actus reus, of genocide, the least controversial act was killing 
members of the group.
209
 Even though murder was the least controversial act included, 
there is no threshold on how much murder equals genocide; it is the combination of the 
act and the intent that can lead to a determination of genocide.
210
 A higher number of 
killings may make the case for genocide easier but there is not a limit that must be 
reached before that determination is made, the impact of this is that even a small number 
of killings can be genocide; the important part of the act is the intent.
211
The second act 
defined is 'causing serious bodily or mental harm'; this comes from the Secretariat Draft 
which included the prohibition of biological experiments and it was France that decided 
that a more general view of bodily harm should be adopted.
212
 This has been expanded to 
include rape and sexual violence based on the interpretation of the ICTR, which ruled 
that "serious bodily or mental harm, without limiting itself thereto, to mean acts of 
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torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution."
213
 The 
third offense does not even require actual damage to be done, it simply requires that 
actions are taken that are calculated to bring about the destruction of the group.
214
 The 
provision aids in demonstrating that the convention recognized that there are means to 
commit or attempt to commit genocide that does not involve murder. The fourth 
offensive act stems from the use of sterilization and castration practices in Nazi Germany 
and has even been expanded by the ICTR to include rape as well.
215
 The final offensive 
act is the forcible transfer of children. This act is not similar to any of the previous acts as 
its impact is solely cultural because, "Presumably, when children are transferred from one 
group to another, their cultural identity may be lost. They will be raised within another 
group, speaking its language, participating in its culture, and practicing its religion."
216
 
Forced transfer of children was originally included as a part of the cultural genocide 
provision in the original drafts as the transfers results in an immediate loss of culture and 
not necessarily death or physical harm.
217
 
 Genocide is characterized by intent and the mens rea of genocide has two 
components as defined in the Rome Statute Article 30; knowledge and intent.
218
  The first 
part, knowledge "[m]eans awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will 
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occur in the ordinary course of events."
219
 In this sense,  knowledge simply means that 
the perpetrator was privy to information about the plan or common design, this does not 
mean that they have to have participated in designing or creating the plan.
220
 This should 
also not be confused with the idea that the perpetrator has to be aware that the act 
constitutes the crime of genocide itself, it requires only that the perpetrator is aware of the 
genocidal policy or plan.
221
 Another way that knowledge can be proven is if the 
prosecution can prove 'willful blindness.
222
 This means that if there is no proof that a 
person knew of the exact plans, they could have sufficient knowledge of a genocidal 
act.
223
 The second aspect of mens rea is intent, dolus specialis. This means that the 
perpetrator means to engage in the specific act, however, in terms of genocide this also 
means that the prosecutor has to prove that this intent was genocidal; otherwise the act 
does not reach the threshold of genocide.
224
  
C. Cultural Genocide Defined 
With the understanding the culture and the current definition of genocide, the 
work of defining cultural genocide can now begin.  The framing of cultural genocide 
must also take into account the purpose of a cultural genocide law in and of itself; it 
exists to punish drastic measures intended to destroy a group and does not deal with non 
forced assimilation. Even Raphael Lemkin specified that cultural genocide laws were 
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aimed at drastic measures intending to destroy a group and not policies of assimilation 
that do  not intend the complete disappearance of a group.
225
 Furthermore, cultural 
genocide acts can be a prelude to or appear in conjunction with physical genocide in 
which there is no doubt that there is intent to destroy a group.
226
  These laws against 
cultural genocide will not seek to prevent any form of cultural change as such changes 
are inevitable. These changes result from increasing contact between cultures and various 
changes cannot be prevented without complete isolation.
227
 Therefore, a working 
definition of cultural genocide should take into account these differences and require a 
level of special intent and specific actus reus that would prevent the abuse of the law. 
 The proposed change is a definition of cultural genocide that can either be added 
as an amendment to the Genocide Convention or used as the foundation for a separate 
convention on cultural genocide. The majority of the foundation of the current definition 
of genocide will remain the same especially the mens rea. The reason for keeping the 
mens rea the same for cultural genocide is to avoid a broad definition in which any 
potential action could be labeled cultural genocide. That would result in a 
destigmatization of the crime and therefore defeat the purpose of labeling the acts as 
genocide in the first place. 
 The place to begin formulating the definition is through the original definitions 
proposed by the drafting committee. The Secretariat Draft defined cultural genocide as 
the following, 
. . .  the destruction of the specific character of the targeted group(s) through destruction or 
expropriation of its means of economic perpetuation; prohibition or curtailment of its 
language; suppression of its religious, social or political practices; destruction or denial of 
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access to its religious or other sites, shrines or institutions; destruction or denial of use and 
access to objects of sacred or sociocultural significance, forced dislocation; expulsion or 
dispersal of its members; forced transfer or remove of its children, or any other means.
228 
The problem with this definition begins with the destruction of economic perpetuation. 
There is no direct link between economic perpetuation and cultural boom. Secondly, 
destruction of economic perpetuation does not in and of itself destroy the culture.  A 
working definition of cultural genocide should ensure that the acts have a direct link to 
the destruction of a culture; otherwise the door for abuse remains wide open. 
Furthermore, economic perpetuation is an extremely vague concept and would have 
incredibly varying definitions worldwide. The next problem is the curtailment of 
languages; this is where national assimilation policies will create tensions, pushback, and 
problems.. Most states have assimilation policies that include provisions which state that 
official language(s)  are taught in all schools. This is where a working definition would 
define the difference between moderate assimilation policies and cultural genocide. There 
is a difference between having a national official language taught at school and imposing 
measures to prevent a group from using their language with the intent to destroy it. For 
example, in New Zealand, the Maori were punished for speaking their language in school 
and that can be seen as a genocidal act, whereas simply having the English as the 
language of instruction would not.
229
The analysis of the new definition would also be 
sure to emphasize the dolus specialis that is required when determining genocide. 
The next definition proposed was the draft committee during the Convention 
meetings. It read, 
In this convention, genocide also means any of the following deliberate acts committed 
with the intention of destroying the language or culture of a national, racial, or religious 
group on the grounds of national or racial origin or religious belief. 
(1) prohibiting the use of language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, 
prohibiting the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group; 
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(2) destroying, or preventing the use of, the libraries, museums, schools, historical 
monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the 
group.
230 
Due to the limited nature of this draft, it is the product of several negotiations and is 
focused more on pleasing states than pressuring states to pursue an active plan of 
protecting minority groups. This definition does take a step in the right direction by 
stating that the intent is to destroy the language or culture which emphasizes dolus 
specialis. The second positive step with this definition is the use of "or" between 
"language" and "culture", which allows people who only target one aspect to still be 
prosecuted. However, what needs to be included is religion, because people within a 
single territory may have a similar language and culture, but a specific religion may be 
targeted for destruction. The use of the phrase "based on . . . religious belief" in the text 
does not have the same meaning. The current meaning of the text states that cultural 
genocide is perpetrated there is an attempt to destroy language or culture based on 
religious belief. That combination does not take into account situations where the only 
difference is religious belief. The language should be clearer in order to ensure a 
universal understanding of the acts that constitute cultural genocide. 
Based on the previous drafts of a cultural genocide definition, the following is the 
best definition that can be used as a framework to shape a more refined definition of 
cultural genocide.  This is by no means an exhaustive list of offensive acts that can 
qualify as cultural genocide and this definition is by no means a legal working definition.  
 In this Convention, the act of genocide can also mean any of the following acts, with the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the language, culture, or religion, of a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Prohibiting the use of language of the group in daily intercourse or schools. 
(b) Destroying or prohibiting access to religious sites 
(c) Prohibiting the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group 
(d) Forced dislocation 
(e) Dispersal or expulsion of its members 
(f) Destroying or prohibiting access to libraries, museums, schools, historical 
monuments.
231
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This definition seeks a synthesis of the drafts of the definition of cultural genocide and 
the current definition of genocide. The reason for separating the various acts is to ensure 
that each offense can stand on its own as proof of cultural genocide. Just as in the current 
definition, a perpetrator must not commit every single offensive act in order to be liable 
for genocide. Secondly, offensive act (f) includes multiple acts because the destruction of 
one of those cultural objects would not have significant enough impact on the culture 
being targeted. The first five are separated because each act could lead to the destruction 
of the targeted culture.  
Therefore, I propose a definition which draws inspiration from the current 
definition of genocide, the work of cultural experts, and the work of the drafting 
committee of the Genocide Convention, in order to synthesize all of these ideas into a 
working definition that can clearly provide a legal framework.  The definition seeks to 
bring in the components of culture in way that allows the law to be efficiently applied 
with very little vagueness.  The definition reads as it would in a convention; 
Recognizing the importance and that the loss of cultural diversity harms all of humanity, 
and, 
 
Being convinced that cultural genocide is a precursor to physical genocide and is a 
necessary component of crimes of genocide; 
 
Cultural genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, religious, or linguistic group, as such: 
(a) Prohibiting the use of language of the group  
(b) Destroying the books, publications, or texts printed in the language of the 
group or of religious works or the prohibition of new publications. 
(c) Destroying or preventing the use of the libraries, museums, schools, 
historical monuments, places of worship, or other cultural institutions and 
objects of the group. 
(d) Forced exile of members of the group 
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(e) Forced dislocation.232 
 
This definition is written from the perspective of a typical human rights treaty beginning 
with broad statements about the purpose of the treaty and the foundation for what is laid 
out within the text. I begin this particular definition explaining the importance of culture 
to create the understanding from the beginning that the loss of culture impacts all of 
humanity and not simply the targeted group. Secondly, the foundation is laid that 
genocide is part and parcel of physical genocide and thus demonstrating the gravity of 
cultural genocide and the necessity for punishment. The specific definition begins with 
the statement that any of the acts are considered cultural genocide, this is to emphasize 
that all of the acts do not have to happen simultaneously in order for a determination of 
cultural genocide to be made. Similar, to the current definition of genocide, perpetrators 
do not have to engage in all acts, although they may and most often do engage some or 
even all acts simultaneously.  The next section of the definition details the intent, which 
is the same as the intent found in the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention.  
The dolus specialis exists for the definition of cultural genocide as well because the crime 
aims to eradicate a group. Furthermore, this special intent creates a brightline for the 
determination of cultural genocide, so that only particularly grave crimes can be labeled 
as cultural genocide. This definition uses the same groups as the Genocide Convention 
because it covers a large spectrum of groups, thereby ensuring that vast amounts of 
groups are protected. I further add the category of „linguistic groups‟ to cover cases in 
which groups may have very similar cultural practices but are differentiated based on 
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language or dialect. This is especially important because language is one of the most 
essential components of culture and distinguishing groups.
233
 The specific acts listed are 
based on the components of culture, and cultural heritage protected by UNESCO.
234
 The 
acts listed seek to cover a broad range of possible violations that would have a direct 
impact o the cultural integrity of the group. The last two acts listed, forced exile, and 
forced dislocation are listed to cover acts in which cultural leaders are forced to separate 
from their group as means to destroy the connection and thus the culture. Forced 
dislocation is included because many groups, especially indigenous groups, have an 
important bond to the land and separating a group from its home can directly destroy way 
of life, artifacts and habits.
235
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This definition is not flawless and it will not fix all of the problems with the 
current definition of genocide nor close all gaps in cultural rights protection.  Despite 
suffering from the same problems of vagueness as the current definition of genocide, a 
definition of cultural genocide faces another problem; that of distinguishing between an 
act of genocide and that of a human rights violation. Although internationally 
criminalized acts violate enumerated human rights, acts of cultural genocide have the 
potential to be confused with general rights violations. This fear is seen in the drafting of 
the Genocide Convention, when states argued that cultural genocide could be confused 
with state policies of assimilation.
236
 An act that violates a groups‟ cultural right is 
inherently discriminatory towards that group insofar as that group is targeted for a 
limitation of their cultural expressions.  Some might argue that this would make it easier 
for every violation of a cultural right to be seen as cultural genocide. The possibility 
exists, however just as every denial of the right to life is not genocide; every violation of 
cultural rights is not genocide. Although a violation of a cultural right may be 
discriminatory and may coincide with the proposed actus reus of cultural genocide, this 
does not automatically mean that requirement of dolus specialis, special intent, has been 
met. For example, a state policy that requires that all public schools be taught in the 
official language may be seen as a violation of cultural rights; however that is different 
from a policy that persecutes a particular group in their private use of the language of 
their group. While, the first state policy attempts to create a uniformity of language in a 
nationwide school system, the second has a significantly higher likelihood of being 
attached to the intent to destroy that particular culture by exterminating its language. This 
requires similar discretion based on legal facts similar to that used when labeling an act 
as genocide.  The same way in which every act claimed to be genocide is not labeled as 
such, every act that can be seen socially as cultural genocide, may not meet the legal 
requirements. This definition seeks to create a balance between legal pragmatism and the 
intricacies of cultural protection. 
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Culture as an essential part of each human and as the unique factor that 
distinguishes one group from another must be protected. This paper is not an exhaustive 
analysis of the concept of cultural genocide, nor does it provide a perfect working 
definition of cultural genocide. This serves as a framework from which the international 
community can gather ideas and information when drafting a new article that would 
protect minority and indigenous groups. It is important to begin reanalyzing problems 
with the prohibition of cultural genocide and reevaluating priorities in international law. 
The work of protecting groups began with the creation of the Genocide Convention and 
needs to be continued and expanded upon as groups are in danger of destruction through 
non-physical means. Genocide ". . .  shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great 
losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these 
human groups."
237
 It is because of the importance and value of ethno/cultural diversity 
that the international community needs to end its obsession with body counts when it 
comes to determining genocide and get back to the root of the crime; the destruction of a 
unique and distinct human group. 
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